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Abstract
The dual crises of the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the global financial crisis has prompted
a call for explanations of non-equilibrium market dynamics. Recently a promising approach
has been the use of agent based models (ABMs) to simulate aggregate market dynamics. A key
aspect of these models is the endogenous emergence of critical transitions between equilibria,
i.e. market collapses, caused by multiple equilibria and changing market parameters. Several
research themes have developed microeconomic based models that include multiple equilibria:
social decision theory (Brock and Durlauf), quantal response models (McKelvey and Palfrey),
and strategic complementarities (Goldstein). A gap that needs to be filled in the literature is a
unified analysis of the relationship between these models and how aggregate criticality emerges
from the individual agent level. This article reviews the agent-based foundations of markets
starting with the individual agent perspective of McFadden and the aggregate perspective of
catastrophe theory emphasising connections between the different approaches. It is shown that
changes in the uncertainty agents have in the value of their interactions with one another, even
if these changes are one-sided, plays a central role in systemic market risks such as market
instability and the twin crises effect. These interactions can endogenously cause crises that are
an emergent phenomena of markets.
1 Introduction
Multi-agent models have grown in popularity [2, 5, 64, 9, 34, 37] as a way in which to simu-
late complex market dynamics that might have no closed form solutions. This has prompted a
call [34, 20, 48] for their general use in understanding markets and economies in crisis. Recent work
using agent-based models of large markets has looked at the macro-market dynamics for Washing-
ton DC [38] and the European economy [39, 28]. A multi-agent perspective has been suggested as
a predictor of market crises [21] by using the stock and flow of funds at the balance sheet (agent)
level as in Lavoie and Godley [52, 42], see for example Bezemer [14, 15] and the agent based mod-
elling approach in [45]. Connections between the multi-agent approach and econometrics have also
been studied [18, 33] in which aggregate market signals are compared with agent-based models of
microeconomic interactions. Connecting these different approaches with Gallegati et al’s [36] work
on the ‘period of financial distress’ that may be an indicator of a market at risk of collapse would
be a significant step in understanding market crises.
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The agent-based approaches that have either social utilities or game theory interactions between
the agents plays a central role in the emergence of systemic risks in markets. Gintis [41] has empha-
sised the unifying role that game theory should play in the unification of the behavioural sciences
and Tesfatsion [64, 63] has emphasised a constructivist approach to non-linearities, for example the
early work of Arthur [4, 5, 6] in asset markets and Axelrod [8, 7] in game theory. Specifically these
models do not presuppose the existence of an equilibrium that plays a central role in economics [35].
So while the emphasis in this article will be on bifurcations other non-linear models of generalised
heterogeneous agents [19, 47] and housing markets specifically [29] have demonstrated how chaos
can emerge from otherwise simple models.
Agent-based models are not all the same in their approach to equilibria and the merits of
equilibrium based approaches are covered in Farmer and Geanakoplos [35]. Equilibrium models
can be usefully divided into three categories: the locally unique equilibrium models developed by
Debreu, partial equilibrium models in which equilibrium and non-equilibrium states co-exist in the
same model, and non-equilibrium models where equilibria are not assumed and may not exist.
Locally unique models distinguish between regular and critical economies [26, 27] and assume that
regular economies (locally stable and unique) are sufficiently common to ignore critical states.
Partial equilibrium models such as catastrophe theory [23, 10, 11] allow for equilibrium states but
the focus is on non-equilibrium transitions at critical points. This is the approach of the current
article. Non-equilibrium models do not assume an equilibrium exists [7, 52, 64, 38], the agents
often have bounded cognitive abilities (memory, predictive power, multiple predictive models) and
are heterogeneous both in their description and the role they can play in a market. The partial
equilibrium approach allows us to study what drives a minimal model of non-linear dynamics and
draw insights for developing more complex models. A new approach that bridges the gap between
partial equilibrium models and models that exhibit realistic aggregate market dynamics has been
developed by Gallegati et al [36] in which herding, financial distress, and the distribution of wealth
all play an important role. This is covered in Section 6.
2 Background
The focus of this article is understanding the micro and macro basis of ‘critical markets’, those
markets that are near (or at) a tipping point at which a market is at risk of a non-equilibrium
transition to a new equilibrium state. A promising approach is that of singularity theory [3, In-
troduction] in which qualitative changes in a system occur as the number of equilibrium points
change. The analysis of statistical distributions with multiple equilibria can be found in the earlier
work of Cobb [24] and later Wagenmakers et al [68] and empirical methods have been implemented
in software [44] while applications of this method to aggregate economic time series have recently
been implemented for housing markets [16, 31]. This review connects an important subset of the
issues covered in earlier work as they relate to critical markets and their subsequent collapse.
The risks of critical markets can be illustrated with a non-linear regression. The model is defined
by an nth order polynomial of a dynamic variable xt and parametrised by a vector of coefficients
1:
m = [α0, α1, . . . , αn] ∈ Rn+1. (1)
1These dynamics are put in the context of a market in the Discussion, Section 6
2
The model predicts the outcome of xt based on the previous state xt−1:
xt = α0 + α1xt−1 + ...+ αnxnt−1 ±  = M(xt−1 |m). (2)
The function xt =M(xt−1 |m) has two sources of uncertainty: errors in estimates of m and errors
in the prediction xt. The first type of error changes the market being described to that of a nearby
market, if:
m+ δmi = [α0, . . . , αi + δαi, . . . , αn]
for small constant δ then m+ δmi describes a market nearby to m and m± δm will simply mean
the aggregate uncertainty in market parameters. The second type of error are fluctuations in the
prediction of xt: if x
∗ is a time independent stationary solution of a market m then the equilibrium
x∗ = E(M(x∗ |m)) has statistical fluctuations x∗ ± δx∗ caused by ±.
m1
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Figure 1: Two models Mi(x |mi) and their equilibrium surfaces E(Mi(x∗j |mi)) = x∗j : Plot 1 has
a single unique equilibrium x∗1 and there are no systemic risks for any description m1. Plot 2 is
the more common situation in which a model has multiple, distinct equilibria x∗1 and x
∗
2 for some
descriptions m2. Critical markets are the m2 at which the number of equilibria change.
The systemic risks and market criticality are illustrated in Figure 2 where two different models
M1 andM2 are described by the parameter sets m1 and m2 (the mi in the figures are single valued
representations of multivalued vectors) and equilibria are indexed by j: x∗j = E(Mi(x∗j |mi)). Plot
1 shows a systemically risk-free marketM1 that has a globally unique, stable equilibrium for every
m1 where small variations in the equilibrium state x
∗
1 ± δx∗ or the market’s description m1 ± δm
never results in a qualitative change in the location of the equilibrium.
Plot 2 is the more common case in which there are multiple locally unique equilibria for some
values of m2. By ‘locally unique’ it is meant [27] that for sufficiently small variations x
∗
1 ± δx∗ or
m2 ± δm the market returns to either the same or a nearby equilibrium. However there are two
3
types of systemic risk present in Plot 2 that are not present in Plot 1. Near a bifurcation point
a small δx∗1 results in x1 passing over a threshold value (the unstable equilibrium, dashed blue
line) and goes through a non-equilibrium transition to the substantively different equilibrium at
x∗2. Alternatively, for a small change in m2 the market will become critical before collapsing to a
substantively different equilibrium near x∗2.
The study of such critical transitions was stimulated by the work of Thom who developed a
theory of singularities called catastrophe theory [65] describing the abrupt qualitative changes in
dynamical systems. Specifically Thom was interested in the generic stability of the singularities
of potential functions M(x |m) : Ri×j → Ri that describe the state of a system where i is the
dimension of the state variables and j is the co-dimension of the control parameters. A key result
is that catastrophes can be classified into seven ‘elementary catastrophes’ and these are a stable,
generic property of systems with a maximum dimension of two and a maximum co-dimension of
four. More details follow in Section 3. Early on the connection between economics and catastrophe
theory was recognised by economists such as Balasko [10] and Dierker [30].
Catastrophe theory has found many applications in economics having been used in financial
markets [71], urban housing dynamics [23, 69], and housing markets [31, 16]. Early on though
there were significant criticisms of the excessive and at times inappropriate application of Thom’s
theory to systems, including economics, in which it was argued the approach was not warranted.
Rosser [59] has reviewed the criticisms relating specifically to economics and concludes that the
application of catastrophe theory, and the broader work on singularity theory, can be a productive
approach to economic analysis. The applicability of singularity theory in applied economics has
recently progressed with statistical techniques for detecting catastrophes in time series [68, 44] and
their application to market dynamics [12, 11, 31].
This article reviews and develops a theoretical foundation that connects the macro perspective
of bifurcations and catastrophe theory to the micro perspective of agent decisions in the tradition
of Lucas’ critique of macroeconomics [53, 37, 13]. Section 3 reviews the background on catastro-
phe theory and game theory, introducing a qualitative connection between the structural changes
of catastrophe theory and bifurcations of Nash equilibria. Section 4 introduces three approaches
to microeconomic markets: McFadden’s approach [55], the social decision theory of Brock and
Durlauf [17], and the Quantal Response Equilibrium of McKelvey and Palfrey [56]. McFadden’s
approach has no interactions between agents and market nonlinearities stem from nonlinear utility
functions. Brock and Durlauf’s approach extends McFadden to agents in an endogenous, homo-
geneous ‘social field’ in which nonlinearities stem from an additive social utility. McKelvey and
Palfrey is shown to be similar to Brock and Durlauf where the social field is replaced with explicit
pairwise interactions between agents who can have different utility functions. All three models
include a stochastic heterogeneity in the utility function for each agent. Section 5 is a comparative
analysis between models, the emergence of market criticality, and the twin crises effect. The final
section, Section 6, discusses the time dependent evolution of Gallegati et al [36] and its relationship
to market crises and the potential games of Sandholm [60].
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Figure 2: Macroscopic properties of housing markets. Four stylised representations of a
housing market index in which the equilibrium price bifurcates at point B. Solid lines are stable
equilibrium points of the market, dashed lines are unstable equilibrium points, and arrows indicate
the direction the market would move if it were away from equilibrium. Bifurcations such as these
have been derived from housing market data in [31].
3 Bifurcations in the Macro and Micro of Markets
Catastrophe theory arises naturally in optimisation problems [3, Chapt. 10] and Nash equilibria
are an example in which optimisation leads to instabilities in the number of equilibria. In the first
part of this section the stochastic generalisation of catastrophe theory is introduced. In the second
part the relationship between instabilities in ordered preferences and instabilities in Nash equilibria
are introduced.
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3.1 Stochastic catastrophe theory and critical markets
In the preface to Catastrophe Theory [3] Arnol’d presents the earlier work in singularity theory
that led to Thom developing catastrophe theory [65]. The stability of singularities in an economic
context correspond to the persistence of critical markets subject to minor perturbations in their
description. Examples of catastrophe theory can be found in housing markets [69] and the collapse of
financial [71, 12, 11] and economic [31, 46] markets. The approach begins with a potential function:
W (x|u) : Rm×n → Rm in which x is a vector of m ≤ 2 state variables and u is a vector of n ≤ 4
control parameters [62]. In a one dimensional system with state variable xt and control parameters
u = [u1, u2] catastrophe theory examines the change in the number of stationary solutions of:
dxt = −∂W (xt|u)
∂xt
dt (3)
given by: ∂W (xt|u)∂xt = 0. For example the potential function:
W (xt|u) = 1
4
x4t −
1
2
u1x
2
t − u2xt. (4)
has been used to describe asset markets [12, 31] in which xt is a market index. The stationary
states of the system are the specific x that solve the equation:
−∂W (xt|u)
∂xt
∣∣∣∣
xt=x
= −x3 + u1x+ u2 = 0. (5)
Figure 3 shows the time independent stationary points xt ≡ x of Equation 5 as an equilibrium
surface that is conditionally dependent on the control parameters u1 and u2. The covector u plays
the same role as m in the non-linear regression described in the Introduction, i.e. it is the paramet-
ric descriptor of a market. The projection of the bifurcation points onto the control plane u1 × u2
is called the critical set and it separates region A with one equilibrium from region B with three
equilibria.
A drawback of the original catastrophe theory is that stochasticity is not represented in the
theory. Cobb [24] extended the theory to stochastic differential equations and this was improved
on by Wagenmakers et al. [68]. The approach is to add noise to the evolutionary dynamics:
dxt = −∂V (xt|u)
∂xt
dt+ σ(xt)dWt (6)
in which −∂V (xt|u)∂xt (≡ µ(xt) for brevity) describes the deterministic evolution of the system, dWt is
a Weiner diffusion process, and σ(xt) is the state dependent strength of the diffusion process. The
stationary probability distribution of Equation 6 is [68]:
p(x|u, σ(x)) = Z−1 exp
(
2
∫ xt
a
µ(z)− 0.5(dzσ(z)2)
σ(z)2
dz
)
(7)
p(x|u, ξ) = Z−1 exp
(
ξ
∫ xt
a
µ(z)dz
)
(8)
= Z−1 exp (ξV (x |u)) (9)
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Figure 3: Plot 1.: The Cusp catastrophe with three contours shown for fixed u2 and varying u1. A
Pitchfork bifurcation is shown in red and two fold bifurcations are shown in black and blue. Plot
2.: Two distinct regions A and B can be discerned in the projection of the equilibrium surface onto
the control plane u1 × u2 and they are separated by the critical sets of u1 × u2, region A has one
equilibrium point and region B has three equilibrium points.
In Equation 7: dzσ(z)
2 = ddzσ(z)
2, Equation 8 is a simplification in which 2σ(z)−2 = ξ ≡ constant in
z, and Z−1 normalises the probability distributions. For the case in which the noise is independent
of the state, σ(xt) ≡ σ, the potential function of the deterministic case of Equation 3 is proportional
to the potential function of the stochastic case of Equation 6, i.e. W (xt|u) = ξV (x |u). With these
assumptions the stationary points of the deterministic form coincide with the stochastic form.
3.2 Bifurcations in game theory
In this section bifurcations in Nash equilibria are shown to be a result of the instability of agent
preferences as game parameters vary. In the first part the binary preferences of an agent in the
context of the decisions of other agents are introduced. In the second part instabilities in these
preferences are shown to play a central role in the bifurcations of Nash equilibria.
Game theory has two interdependent components, the elements of the game agents play (number
of choices, number of agents, utility functions) and the decision making (optimisation) process of
the agents [22, Chapter 1], i.e. games provide a taxonomy of the strategic interactions between
agents while game theory is a description of the basis on which agents optimise choices. Games also
quantify the ordinal preferences of an agent (e.g. Gilboa [40, Chapter 7]) where preferences are a
partially ordered binary relation Q(·, ·) over a choice set X:
Q(xi, xj) = xi  xj , (xi, xj) ∈ X ×X, (10)
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read as xi is weakly preferred to xj . If (xi  xj) ∧ (xj  xi) an agent is indifferent between
choices: xi ∼ xj and if (xi  xj) ¬ (xi ∼ xj) an agent strongly prefers xi to xj : xi  xj . Utilities
extend ordinal preferences to real valued functions: if xj ∈ X a utility function is U : X → R
and we assume [40] utilities represent ordinal preferences: Q(xi, xj) ⇐⇒ U(xi) ≥ U(xj) ∀i, j.
Games extend the utilities of an agent i to utilities in the context of other agents’ choices: given
xij ∈ Xi and denoting the choices of all other agents as x−i ∈ X−i then agent i’s game utility is
Ui : X
i×X−i → R. We assume that Ui represents i’s ordinal preferences Qi(xij , xik) in the context
of the decisions x−i of other agents if Ui(xij , x
−i) ≥ Ui(xik, x−i) ∀j, k. The Nash equilibrium (NE)
of an n player game is an n−tuple of choices (x1∗, x1∗, . . . , xn∗ ) such that:
Ui(x
i
∗, x
−i
∗ ) ≥ Ui(xij , x−i∗ ), i = 1, . . . , n ∀ xij ∈ Xi. (11)
In 2× 2 games (two players, two choices) there are two possible pure strategy outcomes2, either
one or two NE (for the remainder of this section NE refers to pure strategy NE). The number of NE
are dependent on each agent’s preference relations Qi(·, ·): if an agent’s preference order changes
then the number and location of the NE might also change. Consequently a parameterised utility
function will have regions of the parameter space in which the preference relations of the agents
change and that may result in qualitative changes in the NE.
An example of parameterised 2× 2 games [61, 57]3 is the utility bi-matrix shown in Figure 4 A.
in which C(ooperate) and D(efect) are the two choices available to the two agents. The utility for
strategy (C,C) is R = 1, for (D,D) is P = 0 and these are held fixed while T and S are allowed to
vary. In Figure 4 B. the games are labelled with their common names (if they have one) and the
ordinal relationships between T and S are shown for each region of the T×S parameter space. Note
that not all changes in ordinal relationships results in a change in the number or location of NE.
Looking at the relationship between the Stag Hunt, Harmony, Prisoner’s Dilemma, and Chicken
games a rich variety of changes in the NE occur as the preference ordering of T and S change. For
example in going from the Stag Hunt game in which P > S to the Harmony game in which S > P
a NE at (D,D) disappears whereas going from the Harmony game to the Chicken game in which
R > T → T > R the NE at (C,C) disappears and two NE appear at (D,C) and (C,D).
Abrupt changes in the number of NE as utilities smoothly vary is characteristic of catastrophe
theory in which optimisation leads to instability in the number of fixed points [3]. In game theory
this occurs when the agents’ ordinal preferences become unstable as Qi(·, ·) changes: xj  xk →
xk  xj with an intermediate (critical) state in which xi ∼ xj . The 2 × 2 ordinal games with
intermediate states have been characterised in [50]. In Section 4.3 the Quantal Response Equilibrium
will be introduced in which the Nash Equilibria (both pure and mixed) are a limiting case of
the Quantal Response Equilibrium, and so the bifurcations of Figure 4 are a limiting case of the
bifurcations of the Quantal Response Equilibrium. Figure 5 is the generalisation to the Quantal
Response Equilibrium of the Chicken game in Figure 4 B.
2Mixed strategy NE are not important for what follows.
3Rapoport and Guyer [58] find a total of 78 uniquely identifiable 2×2 games.
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(R=1, R=1) (S, T)
(P=0, P=0)(T, S)
C
A.  Parametric  Utility  Bi-­matrix B.  Pure  Strategy  Nash  Equilibria  Diagram
D
C D
T
S
Prisoner’s 
Dilemma
Chicken
Leader
Battle of 
the Sexes
Harmony
Deadlock
S = R = 1
T = R = 1
S = T
Stag Hunt
Coordination
T>R>P>S
T>R>S>P
T>S>R>P
S>T>R>P
S>R>T>P
S>R>P>T
R>T>S>PR>T>P>S
R>P>T>S
R>P>S>T
R>S>P>T
R>S>T>P
Figure 4: Parametric games: A. The utility bi-matrix with two free parameters T and S for
some symmetrical games. B. The bifurcations of NE as T and S vary. The locations (strategy
pairs) of the NE are shown as red boxes, e.g. the Harmony game has one NE: (CC) and the Stag
Hunt game has two NE: (CC), (DD).
4 Three Models of Decision Theory
Catastrophe theory as presented above has a second drawback: it does not model the decisions
of any economic agent, it is an aggregate (qualitative) model of market dynamics that cannot
make quantitive predictions as pointed out by Thom [66]. There are models though that are
based on microeconomic decisions with bifurcations in their equilibrium states and that permit
quantitive analysis. Here we present McFadden’s [55] original derivation and assumptions which
are then extended to two other important classes of decision models. Some time is spent developing
McFadden’s model as the approach is similar to later models and can be used to shorten the work
that follows. Brock and Durlauf’s social decision model is based an decisions made in the context of
social influences that modify an agent’s utility. Similarly the Quantal Response Equilibrium is based
on a stochastic extension of game theory that is shown to have a ‘social utility’ component analogous
to Brock and Durlauf’s social utility function. It will also be shown that these two approaches give
very similar probability distributions but the interpretations are somewhat different and highlight
different aspects of microeconomic processes that can cause markets to collapse. For comparison
with the stock-flow literature these models should be compared to the dynamic models of Gauldi
et al [45] and Gallegati et al [36] in which critical dynamics and market collapse readily appear.
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4.1 McFadden’s approach to heterogeneity for discrete choices
McFadden [55] begins with an agent i in a large market of N heterogeneous agents in which each
agent needs to choose an xij ∈ Xi where the value of each choice is given by a stochastic utility
function:
U(xij |Zi, εij) = V (xij |Zi) + εij (12)
Decision problem: xij = argmax
xik ∈Xi
(U(xik |Zi, εik)). (13)
V (xij |Zi) is a deterministic ‘public utility’ that each agent knows. For example in a simplified
housing market in which an agent chooses between two types of houses: xij ∈ {H1, H2} and
V (xi1 = H1 |Zi) is conditional on the parameter vector Zi of the property’s characteristics that
is particular to agent i such as the number of bedrooms, land size, or build quality. The second
component of Equation 12 is the uncertainty in U(xij |Zi, εij) that has two common interpreta-
tions [17]. The first is that εij is an innate psychological uncertainty such that each agent is only
able to estimate U(xij |Zi, εij). The second is that U(xij |Zi, εij) is known precisely to agent i but
the population of other agents (or an economic modeller external to the market) only knows the
public component V (xij |Zi) so that εij is the uncertainty attributable to the limited knowledge
an observer of agent i has of their utility. In either case εij is an idiosyncratic stochastic variable
measured across the whole market so that the market is composed of agents that are heterogeneous
in their utilities.
The decision problem of Equation 13 is simplified by assuming all agents have identical utilities
V (xij |Zi) ≡ V (xj |Z) for all xj ∈ X (all i superscripts are dropped for the remainder of this
section). The complement set of a decision variable xj is x−j = X \ xj . Following McFadden [55]
the probability that xj is a better choice than any other is:
p(xj |Z, εj) = p(U(xj |Z, εj) > U(xk |Z, εj), ∀ xk ∈ x−j) (14)
= p(V (xj |Z)− V (xk |Z) > εk − εj , ∀ xk ∈ x−j). (15)
A useful assumption is that the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the noise ε = εj − εk is
Gumbel distributed ε ∼ G(µ, γ):
F (ε) = exp(−e−(ε−µ)/γ), (16)
where µ and γ are non-negative parameters and the standard deviation is a function only of γ:
σ = γpi6−1/2. Assuming the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axiom [55] F (ε) is the
correct cumulative distribution and not just a useful assumption. Dropping the Z notation for
clarity, the probability distribution function (pdf) over choices is the logit distribution, which can
be seen by rewriting Equation 14:
p(xj | εj) = p(V (xj)− V (xk) + εj > εk, ∀ xk ∈ x−j) (17)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
f(ε)
∏
xk ∈ x−j
exp
(− e−(V (xj)−V (xk)+εk))/γ)dε, (18)
in which the location parameter of Equation 16 has been shifted to µ = 0 and
f(ε) = γ−1 exp(−ε/γ − e−ε/γ)
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is the pdf of F (ε). Changing variables to z = exp(−ε/γ):
p(xj | γ) =
∫ +∞
0
e−z
∏
xk ∈ x−j
exp
(− ze−(V (xj)−V (xk))/γ)dz (19)
=
∫ +∞
0
e−z exp
(
− z
∑
xk ∈ x−j
e−(V (xj)−V (xk))/γ
)
dz (20)
=
1
1 + e−V (xj)/γ
∑
xk ∈ x−j e
V (xk)/γ
(21)
p(xj |Z, ξ) = e
ξV (xj |Z)∑
xk ∈X e
ξV (xk |Z) ∀ xj ∈ X, (22)
where in the last step the conditional terms have been included again. When ξ → 0 the estimate
of V (xj) is dominated by the noise term εj and p(xj) is uniform. When ξ → ∞ there is no
heterogeneity in the market because V (xj) is identical for every agent and if there is a single
objectively best choice xk then all agents will make the same choice with probability p(xk) = 1.
The decision problem of Equation 12 then reduces to:
xk = argmax
xj ∈X
(V (xj |Z)) (23)
which is deterministic and can also be seen by rewriting Equation 14:
p(xk |Z) = p(V (xk |Z) > V (xj |Z) ∀ xj ∈ x−i) = 1. (24)
In McFadden’s model the choice of one agent has no influence on the outcome for any other
agent. In this scenario the only way in which a critical market can occur is if V (xi |Z) in Equa-
tion 12 is a high order polynomial, for example fourth order as in Equation 4, and the vector of
coefficients Z is allowed to vary.
An illustrative example is given by McFadden in [54]. He describes V (xi |Z) for a single agent’s
decision problem as the systematic utility and implemented it as a linear function of measured
attributes in which the elements of Z are the coefficients of a linear regression. The example
he used is that of the econometric analysis of alternative freeway routes in which the regressors
were observable attributes such as construction costs, route length, and parkland space and the
coefficients of the regression reflected the ‘tastes’ of decision-makers.
4.2 Social Decision Theory
This section develops social decision theory (SDT) by extending McFadden’s Equation 13 to in-
clude a social utility function. The approach follows Brock and Durlauf [17] in which social factors
influence an agent’s utility and consequently their decisions.
As before and following [32] an economic market is made up of N agents and each agent has
a value function that describes their pay-off for making a binary choice xij ∈ {−1, 1}. Agent i’s
choice of xij maximises a utility function given a set of parameters that describe the characteristics
of the agent’s choices, these characteristics are represented by a vector of traits Zi in the same way
11
as described for Equation 12. Here we extend the earlier discussion by introducing a local influence
from other agents. If −i is the set of neighbouring agents that influence i’s utility for choice xij ,
then a single neighbour of i is k ∈ −i. Discrete choices are identified with a discrete numerical sup-
port: xij ∈ {−1, 1} (xi1 = −1) so that expectations over decision variables have continuous support
〈x〉i = 1− 2p(xi1) ∈ [−1, 1] and the vector of expected values: 〈x〉−i ∈ [−1, 1]m is of length m.
An agent i maximises a stochastic utility by making a binary choice xij ∈ {1,−1}:
U(xij , 〈x〉−i |Zi, εij) = V (xij |Zi) + S(xij , 〈x〉−i |Zi) + εij (25)
Decision problem: xij = argmax
xil∈{−1,1}
U(xil, 〈x〉−i |Zi, εil). (26)
This is an extension of Equations 12 and 13 in which 〈x〉−i are the subjective expectations agent i
has of the strategies of neighbouring agents and S(xij , 〈x〉−i |Zi) is the social portion of the utility
function representing interactions between i and its neighbours. Brock and Durlauf [17] take the
deterministic term V (xij |Zi) as linear in xij and choose the parameters of the following linear
functions h and k so that h is the difference between the deterministic parts of the public utility
for the two choices:
V (xij |Zi) = k(Zi) + xijh(Zi) (27)
h(Zi) =
1
2
(
V (1 |Zi)− V (−1 |Zi)). (28)
The social utility function is:
S(xij , 〈x〉−i |Zi) =
∑
k∈−i
J(Zi,Zk)xij〈x〉k. (29)
We simplify J(Zi,Zk) = J i,k and the total utility is:
U(xij , 〈x〉−i |Zi, εij) = ki + xijhi +
∑
k∈−i
J i,kxij〈x〉k + εij . (30)
Assuming the IIA and Gumbel distributed εij the conditional probability over choices is:
p(xij = ±1 | 〈x〉−i,Zi, ξ) = Z−1 exp
(
ξxij
(
hi +
∑
k∈−i
J i,k〈x〉k)), (31)
where ξ has the same interpretation as it did in Equation 22. The ki and hi are the coefficients
of an agent’s public utility, and so they are known to all agents in the market (c.f. Equation 28).
The average strength of interaction between i and its neighbours −i is J i,−i which replaces the
summation over individual terms J i,k in Equation 30. We interpret J i,−i as the strength of an
endogenous ‘social field’. We also assume that the vector of strategies 〈x〉−i can be approximated
by i’s (subjective) average expected strategy of its neighbours: 〈x〉−i = 〈x〉−i. Equation 31 can be
rewritten in the hyperbolic self-consistent form:
〈x〉i∗ = tanh
(
ξ(h+ J i,−i〈x〉−i∗ )
)
(32)
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In equilibrium an agents’ strategies and their subjective expectations of the influence their neigh-
bours have is the same: 〈x〉i∗ ≡ 〈x〉−i∗ , but maintaining this distinction is useful when discussing
strategic complementarities and comparing models in Section 5. The public plus social plus private
utility is:
U(〈x〉i∗, 〈x〉−i∗ |Z) = k + h〈x〉i∗ + J i,−i〈x〉i∗〈x〉−i∗ + εij . (33)
where Z = [k, h, J i,−i] is to be empirically estimated [18]. Brock and Durlauf [32] observed that
when h = 0 a pitchfork bifurcation occurs, e.g. Figure 2 plot 1, as the uncertainty ξ increases from
0 and when h 6= 0 a discontinuous bifurcation can occur, e.g. Figure 2 plot 3.
There are also two possible contributions to the private utility εij in Equation 33, one from the
public utility and the other from the social utility:
V˜ (xij |Zi) = V (xij |Zi) + ε (34)
S˜(xij , 〈x〉−i |Zi) = S(xij , 〈x〉−i |Zi) + ε (35)
such that: εij = f(ε, ε) (36)
A simple observation with an interesting interpretation is that if εij is attributable only to the
heterogeneity in the social component: f(ε, ε) = ε = εij then agent heterogeneity is due solely
to the interaction term between agents while an individual agent comprehends their public utility
perfectly well. For example in a housing market, V (·) represents the qualities of a house the buyer
wants to buy, the ‘systematic utility’ to which McFadden’s regression analysis could be applied.
However the influence that the house’s neighbourhood has on either the buyer’s or the seller’s
expectation of price, for example the number of houses recently sold in the neighbourhood and for
how much, has an uncertain influence on the price the buyer expects to achieve: the uncertainty in
the buyer’s total utility is due solely to the uncertainty in the utility of the buyer-seller interaction.
4.3 The Quantal Response Equilibrium
The Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) is an alternative to social decision theory when payoffs
are interdependent. Brock and Ioannides [33] have suggested that there is a close parallel between
the Quantal Response Equilibrium and Social Decision Theory, here this connection is made explicit.
In 2×2 games there are two agents, P1 and P2, playing a game G against each other, each with
a binary choice given by two payoff matrices G = {G1,G2}:
P1 :
G1 x21 x22
x11 a
1 c1
x12 b
1 d1
P2 :
G2 x21 x22
x11 a
2 c2
x12 b
2 d2
in which Gi denotes the utility function of Pi. To align notation with SDT 〈x〉i = 1−2p(xi1) ∈ [−1, 1]
and the expected utilities can be written:
V (〈x〉1, 〈x〉2 | G1) = g10 + 〈x〉1g11 + 〈x〉2g12 + 〈x〉1〈x〉2g11,2 (37)
V (〈x〉1, 〈x〉2 | G2) = g20 + 〈x〉1g21 + 〈x〉2g22 + 〈x〉1〈x〉2g21,2 (38)
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where the parameters are derived from the utility functions:
gi0 = (a
i + bi + ci + di)/4, (39)
gi1 = ((b
i + di)− (ai + ci))/4, (40)
gi2 = ((c
i + di)− (ai + bi))/4, (41)
gi1,2 = ((a
i + di)− (bi + ci))/4. (42)
The utilities are grouped to emphasise particular relationships: gi0 is the utility for a uniform
strategy 〈x〉1, 〈x〉2 = 0, gi1 is the difference of the sum of row terms, gi2 is the difference of the
sum of column terms, and gi1,2 is the difference of the sum of diagonal terms. The 〈x〉i weight
these different parameters. The differences gi1 and g
i
2 are generalisations of Equation 28 to that
of two agents playing a game and gi1,2 is the agent to agent equivalent of the social field J
i,−i of
Equation 32. These relationships are discussed in Section 5.1. The conditional expected utilities
are the utilities to agent i given the choice of −i:
V i(〈x〉−i | Gi, xij = ±1) = gi0 ± gii + 〈x〉−igi−i ± 〈x〉−igi1,2 (43)
Using the conditional expected utilities McKelvey and Palfrey [56] extended the Nash equilibrium
to agents who are imperfect decision-makers by introducing an error vector for each of i’s choices
εi = [εi1, ε
i
2] that are Gumbel distributed as in Equation 16:
U i(xij , 〈x〉−i | Gi, εij) = gi0 + xijgii + 〈x〉−igi−i + xij〈x〉−igi1,2 + εij (44)
z = V i(〈x〉−i | Gi, xi2)− V (〈x〉−i | Gi, xi1) (45)
p(z > εi2 − εi1) =
1
1 + exp(−ξiz) . (46)
Given the IIA axiom and the approach used in Section 4.1 the QRE decision model of McKelvey
and Palfrey [56] is:
p(xij | Gi, 〈x〉−i, ξi) = Z−1 exp
(
ξiV i(〈x〉−i | Gi, xij)
)
(47)
Written in the equilibrium hyperbolic form of Equation 32:
〈x〉i∗ = tanh
(
ξi(gii + g
i
1,2〈x〉−i∗ )
)
(48)
In equilibrium SDT and the QRE include the subjective expectations of other agents 〈x〉−i, but the
SDT model in equilibrium has 〈x〉i∗ ≡ 〈x〉−i∗ whereas this may not be true for the QRE, depending
on each agent’s individual parameters Gi and ξi.
To establish their result, McKelvey and Palfrey assumed the Gumbel distribution but not the
IIA axiom. Instead they used Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem and Sard’s Theorem (Theorem 1 and
the Appendix of [56]) to establish the existence and discreteness of equilibria just as Debreu did
in his original analysis of the existence and countability of equilibria for deterministic economies [26].
Equations 45 and 46 illustrate how critical preferences of game theory (c.f. the discussion follow-
ing Equation 11) enter into probability distributions over utilities. In the case of zero uncertainty in
utilities Equation 46 reduces to p(V i(〈x〉−i | Gi, xi2) > V i(〈x〉−i | Gi, xi1)) = 1 ⇐⇒ xi2  xi1. Prefer-
ence relations are critical when xi2 ∼ xi1 and bifurcations may occur in game theory illustrated in
Figure 4.
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5 Comparative Analysis, Critical Markets, and Twin Crises
5.1 Structural similarities in mathematical descriptions
A comparison between the QRE, Equation 47, and the SDT, Equation 31, shows their structural
similarities. An important distinction though is that in the QRE the interaction terms given by Gi
can differ between agents whereas the SDT only considers interactions between agents of the same
type. Writing the two utilities together to compare coefficients of like terms:
SDT: U(〈x〉i, 〈x〉−i |Zi, ε) = ki + 〈x〉ihi + 〈x〉i〈x〉−iJ i,−i + ε, (49)
QRE: U(〈x〉i, 〈x〉−i | Gi, εi) = gi0 + 〈x〉igii + 〈x〉−igi−i + 〈x〉i〈x〉−igi1,2 + εi. (50)
The coefficients gi0 and g
i
−i appear in the QRE utilities but not the QRE itself (Equation 48) and the
ki term appears in the SDT utility but not in the equilibrium solution of the SDT (Equation 32).
However they are important at the level of the utility function as follows. The spillover from agent
−i to agent i for some deterministic utility function V i(xi, x−i) with continuous decision variables
xi and x−i is defined as [25]:
∂V i(xi, x−i)
∂x−i
=
{
> 0 positive spillovers
< 0 negative spillovers
(51)
Assuming for simplicity J i,−i = gi1,2 = 0 so that there are no interaction terms in agent utilities,
then the SDT utility has no spillover from −i to i, whereas the spillover for the QRE utility is:
∂V (〈x〉i, 〈x〉−i | Gi)
∂〈x〉−i = g
i
−i (52)
A notable example of spillovers is in the Prisoner’s Dilemma in which gi1,2 = 0 and negative
spillovers dominate the payoff to both agents, i.e. gi−i > g
i
i . In this case not only are the QRE and
the SDT models indifferent to spillovers at the level of decision-making, but so is the utility of the
SDT (but not the QRE). This can be accounted for by extending the SDT utility:
SDT: U(〈x〉i, 〈x〉−i |Zi, εj) = ki + 〈x〉ihi + 〈x〉−if i + 〈x〉i〈x〉−iJ i,−i + εj , (53)
Then the extended vector of coefficients for the SDT: Zi = [ki, hi, f i, J i,−i] are formally equiv-
alent to the interactions between two agents playing an underlying game G if the game utilities are
symmetric, for example the games in Figure 4. This equivalence can be seen by writing the payoff
parameters as a vector Gi = [ai, bi, ci, di] (c.f. Equations 39 to 42) so that the relationship between
Gi and Zi can be written as a system of linear equations AGi = Zi:
1
4

1 1 1 1
−1 1 −1 1
−1 −1 1 1
1 −1 −1 1


ai
bi
ci
di
 =

gi0
gi1
gi2
gi1,2
 =

ki
hi
f i
J i,−i
 (54)
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The QRE utilities can be recovered from the SDT parameters by solving Gi = A−1Zi:
1 −1 −1 1
1 1 −1 −1
1 −1 1 −1
1 1 1 1


ki
hi
f i
J i,−i
 =

ai
bi
ci
di
 (55)
The SDT parameters can be found empirically via econometric methods, see for example [17, 33] for
recent work. This relationship between the two formulations is important because observing game
theory utilities directly in economic data might be difficult whereas econometric techniques are
known for SDT. The critical term is J i,−i as this coefficient encodes the strategic complementarity
in the SDT [18] and is necessary for bifurcations in the QRE and SDT, introduced next.
5.2 Critical markets and strategic complementarity
Spillover effects cannot cause critical markets by themselves. For critical markets there needs to be
an interaction between the agents’ at the level of their decisions and not just their utilities. The
appropriate analysis is that of strategic complementarity and strategic substitutability [25], the
definition will be given and then the implications for the SDT and QRE are discussed. Using the
notation of Equation 51 the definition is:
∂2V i(xi, x−i)
∂x−i∂xi
=
{
> 0 strategic complementarity
< 0 strategic substitutability
(56)
Applying the definition to Equations 49 and 50:
∂2U(〈x〉i, 〈x〉−i |Zi, ε)
∂〈x〉i∂〈x〉−i = J
i,−i (57)
∂2U(〈x〉i, 〈x〉−i | Gi, ε)
∂〈x〉i∂〈x〉−i = g
i
1,2 (58)
In 2 × 2 games it is sufficient for there to be three Nash equilibria which is satisfied if the strict
inequalities gii ± gi1,2 < 0 < gii ∓ gi1,2 hold, c.f. the exponent in Equation 48.
To illustrate market criticality for the QRE consider a market in which agent-to-agent inter-
actions are based on two types of agents, Pi and P−i, playing a game G = {Gi,G−i} with fixed
utilities. There are a total of N (even) agents and there are N/2 agents of each type. The market
operates by randomly assigning every agent of type Pi to pair with an agent of type P−i and the
payoff for their choices is given by G. All agents of type Pi have an aggregate average strategy of
〈x〉i and likewise the aggregate average strategy of type P−i agents is 〈x〉−i. This model is based on
the behavioural experiments using game theory across a population of players in [57]. The market
uncertainties ξ = [ξ1, ξ2] are allowed to vary and these uncertainties are described in more detail
below. The example has symmetric utilities:
P1 :
G1 x21 x22
x11 0 7
x12 2 6
P2 :
G2 x21 x22
x11 0 2
x12 7 6
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There are three Nash equilibria, two pure: (x12, x
2
1), (x
1
1, x
2
2) and one mixed: (〈x〉1, 〈x〉2) = ( 13 , 13 ).Pi’s expected utility and QRE are:
V (〈x〉i, 〈x〉−i | Gi) = 1
4
(15 + 〈x〉i + 11〈x〉−i − 3〈x〉i〈x〉−i), (59)
〈x〉i∗ = tanh(ξi(1− 3〈x〉−i∗ )), (60)
in which gi1,2 = −3. Note that 1 − 3 < 0 < 1 + 3 so the QRE has either one or three equilibria
except at critical parameter values: ξ∗ = [ξ1,∗, ξ2,∗]. The QRE equilibrium surface parametrised by
uncertainties [ξ1, ξ2] is shown in Figure 5 for P1’s equilibrium 〈x〉1. The red curve (left plot) is the
bifurcation set on the equilibrium surface and the projection of the bifurcation set onto the control
plane ξ1 × ξ2 is the critical set ξ∗ of the market.
A
B
Figure 5: Left: The QRE for the Chicken game where the uncertainties ξ1 and ξ2 control the
number of fixed points. The red curve is where the gradient of the fixed point surface diverges,
defining the bifurcations at which the number of fixed points change. A critical market is shown
with its transition from an unstable equilibrium to a stable equilibrium. Right: The critical set
(blue curve) is the projection of the red bifurcation curve onto the control plane viewed from directly
above, region A has one fixed point and region B has three fixed points. The surface, bifurcation
curves, and critical set were derived using Mathematica.
5.3 Strategic interactions and the ‘twin crises’ effect
The twin crises effect is a problem caused by the interactions between two markets. Kaminsky and
Reinhart [49] studied the relationship between co-occurring crises in currency markets and banking
finding that there was a causative relationship from a crisis in banking to a crisis in currency mar-
kets. Goldstein [43] has shown that strategic complementarities (c.f. Equation 56) play a crucial
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role in generating a feedback cycle between these markets during a crisis. Here we extend this
notion to QRE based markets by showing that a bifurcation generated in one market induces a
bifurcation in a second market, even if the second market’s parameters Zi = [ai, bi, ci, di, ξi] remain
fixed.
Previously interactions between agents were restricted to agents within a single market. In the
following agents will represent two distinct markets where one market might produce a mixture
of two goods that are then sold into another market of buyers. The notation developed earlier
for the QRE of a single market composed of two types of agents passes through to the analysis
of two markets described as two agents interacting. The average strategy of all producers P1 is4
x1 ∈ [−1, 1] and sellers P2 is x2 ∈ [−1, 1] and we express the market QREs as functions of market
uncertainties ξi, ξ−i and strategies xi, x−i:
xi = f i(x−i, ξi), (61)
= f i(f−i(xi, ξ−i), ξi), (62)
x−i = f−i(xi, ξ−i), (63)
= f−i(f i(x−i, ξi), ξ−i). (64)
To make this explicit in terms of the QRE, we can express each market’s equilibrium state as:
xi∗ = tanh(ξ
i(gii + g
i
1,2x
−i
∗ )) (65)
= tanh
(
ξi
(
gii + g
i
1,2 tanh(ξ
−i(g−i−i + g
−i
1,2x
i
∗))
))
(66)
Note that each market is independent of the other market’s strategy but they are coupled via
their uncertainties ξi and ξ−i and their parameter sets G. To find the set of critical points where
the QRE surface diverges we compute the Jacobian, see [70]. For example ∂x
i
∂ξi is:
∂f i
∂x−i
∂f−i
∂xi
∂xi
∂ξi
+
∂f i
∂ξi
− ∂x
i
∂ξi
= 0 (67)
f i1f
−i
1
∂xi
∂ξi
+ f i2 −
∂xi
∂ξi
= 0 (68)
f i2
f i1f
−i
1 − 1
=
∂xi
∂ξi
(69)
The simplification in notation at Equation 68 uses the subscript to denote differentiation with
respect to either the first or the second argument of f i in equations 61 and 63. A similar set of
computations for the remaining terms gives the Jacobian:
Jξx =
1
f i1f
−i
1 − 1
[
f i2 f
i
1f
−i
2
f i2f
−i
1 f
−i
2
]
(70)
which diverges when f i1f
−i
1 = 1. The numerical solution of this equation has been mapped onto the
equilibrium surface of Figure 5 (left plot) and then projected onto the control plane (right plot) to
4Angle brackets representing average strategies have been dropped to reduce clutter in the notation.
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form the critical set of the market.
Note that the criteria for the equilibrium of market i to be critical: f i1f
−i
1 = 1 is the same
criteria for market −i due to the symmetry between i and −i, when the criteria is satisfied by
one market it is satisfied by the other. Specifically, from Figure 5 if ξ1 varies while ξ2 remains
fixed the equilibrium of both markets moves, markets can become critical markets and a market
crisis will occur as x1 discontinuously drops to a new and distant equilibrium point as illustrated
by the arrow in Figure 5. This induces a collapse in x2, i.e. changes in the uncertainty in mar-
ket 1 causes a collapse in that market and this induces a subsequent collapse in market 2 despite
market 2 remaining unchanged in its uncertainty ξ2, causing twin crises to occur in the two markets.
To illustrate with a hypothesis, during the sub-prime mortgage crisis the financial markets may
have changed their estimate of the value of the banks that held mortgages. So even if the banks
knew the value of their own assets the change in the financial market’s uncertainty in the value of
the interaction between the two markets may have been sufficient to cause the twin crisis. This is
intuitively sensible, if two markets are interconnected and one collapses this should have an impact
on the equilibrium of the other market, which in turn has an impact on the first market, and so
the market collapse feeds on itself. The general nature of this effect is reflected in the generality of
Equations 61 to 64.
6 Discussion
A shortcoming of the analysis presented here is that, apart from catastrophe theory, the models do
not have a temporal aspect: all equations are time independent and it is implicitly assumed that
each makes a decision at fixed point in time. This assumption is relaxed in Gallegati et al [36] based
in part on the social interactions literature of Brock and Durlauf [32, 17]. They use a stochastic
model of a time dependent (log) price pt at time t for a market with N agents each having a binary
decision variable xi,t ∈ {−1, 1} and an excess demand function xt−1 (notation is adapted to this
article):
xt−1 = N−1
N∑
i=1
xi,t−1 (71)
pt = pt−1 + f(xt) + zσ (72)
where f(xt) is a deterministic function of the influence excess demand has on price evolution, σ
is an NID(0, 1) process, z is the standard deviation and the equilibrium price p∗ is achieved for
f(xt) = 0, c.f. Equations 2 and 6 for the time evolution of a market outcome or index for a known
potential function. By introducing a static expectation that all agents have of the market’s excess
demand at time t: xet = xt−1 they write the time evolution of each agent’s utility function as:
Ui,t = (pt − pt−1)xi,t + Jxi,txet + εi,t (73)
in which pt is the expected (log) price at time t and and the social interaction strength J has the
same interpretation as it does in the models discussed earlier.
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The authors extend their model to include agents’ wealth distribution dynamics, budget con-
straints, and positive transaction costs. These inclusions are sufficient to model the dynamics of
market crashes that include a period of financial distress (PFD) in which a market peaks and might
appear to have settled at a new equilibrium, or even be easing downwards, but this distressed
period in fact precedes a market crisis. This period might last days or years. The perspective is
microeconomic and described in terms of agent interactions [51, page 31]: It is a period at which a
large proportion of the agents are almost at the point of needing to liquidate assets as their ability
to service debt contracts. Such PFDs are observed [36] in 36 of the 46 historical crises identified in
Kindelberger’s book Manias, Panics and Crashes [51] and it appears to be a key indicator of crises
in asset markets. Some recent market dynamics, including the period immediately preceding the
US sub-prime mortgage crisis and some sections of the current Australian housing market (at the
time of writing), appear to have this PFD aspect to them.
The potential functions of catastrophe theory play a key role for whole market analyses in which
there is a gradient dynamic [59]. In this case Equations 3 and 6 are integrable and the solution
has the form of Equation 8. In game theory this is true for two player, two choice games in which
the mean valued strategies 〈x〉i reduce the number of strategic variables from two to one. This
implies that the Brock and Durlauf binary model is integrable and so a potential function can be
found, see Sandholm [60, Example 4.4]. The requirement for a gradient system to be (locally) inte-
grable is equivalent to symmetry of the Slutsky matrix of a market [1] and the relationship between
the Slutsky matrices, potential functions, and catastrophe theory is covered in Balasko [10]. The
general class of problems associated with potential functions and economic dynamics are covered
in [67] and Wagenmakers’ analysis [68] allows econometric techniques to be applied to the detection
of catastrophes.
A final note on the relationship between the different perspectives in this review. Gintis’ call
for game theory to unify the social sciences [41] is consistent with econometric techniques used to
detect social interactions between agents [32]. This in turn addresses Lucas’ critique [53] as the pa-
rameters that drive agent-to-agent interactions in game theory may be recovered from macroscopic
measurements of collective social behaviour. This goes some way to understanding how the different
approaches that have been developed in different branches of economic theory can be unified in a
consistent way.
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